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When Will the Corporate Form Save Taxes?
Richard L. Strecker*
Pangloss was professor of metaphysicotheologico-cosmolonigology.
He proved admirably that there is no effect without a cause, and that,
in this best of all possible worlds, the Baroes castle was the most
magnificent of castles, and his lady the best of all possible Baronesses.
"It is demonstrable," said he, "that things cannot be otherwise than
as they are; for all being created for an end, all is necessarily for the
best end. Observe, that the nose has been formed to bear spectacles,
thus we have spectacles . . . Consequently they who assert that all is
well have said a foolish thing, they should have said all is for the best."
VOLTAIRE, CADnE
I. INMODUCrON
While major emphasis will be placed upon the tax considerations
involved in answering the question posed by the title, the broader
problem is aptly stated in the familiar phrase, "Choice of Business
Form."' It is not possible to consider this problem realistically without
taking into account the context of the business and private law con-
siderations which must enter into the decision, and may indeed be
controlling over the tax factors. Therefore, the question, "When Will
the Corporate Form Save Taxes?" will be discussed in the light of the
full legal and business milieu.
We often think of this problem-choice of business form-as a legal
one, and indeed in some sense it is. But the initial decision is a
business one and not one made by the lawyer: whether the venture
will comprise the efforts of a single individual as owner and also
furnisher of capital, or whether it will be a joint venture (I use that
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Committee on Affiliated and
Related Corporations, Section of Taxation, American Bar Association. A.B., 1947,
LL.B., 1950, University of Cincinnati, LL.M., 1951, Harvard University. This article
is a portion of a proposed book, TAxAION OF CLOSE COOPTronoNs. Chicago:
Callaghan & Co. By Richard L. Strecker. Copyright 1965.
1. For general discussions of this problem, see: RosrmaxcHr, ORGANZiNG, CORPORATE
Am OTnEa BusmFss ENTEmpRmsEs 56-214 (3d ed. 1958); Miller, Choice of Form of
Business Organization, in LEcTumn oN TAXATION OF Busn~ss ENTEPamsEs (University
of Michigan Law School 1952); Axelrad, Choice of Form: Partnership, Corporation, or
In-Between, N.Y.U. 19TH INsT. ON FED. TAx (1961); Hormberg, Corporation or
Partnership, 3 J. OF Mo. BAn 35 (1947); Lanigar, Doing Business as Partnership or
Corporation, 99 J. AccouNTA~cy 48 (1955); Lewis, McClure, & Schroeder, Individual,
Proprietorship, Corporation, 23 1. OF BAn Ass'N OF KANSAS 333 (1955); Sarner,
Choosing the Form of Organization, 8 KAN. L. REV. 522 (1960).
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term without the legal connotation that usually attaches); whether it
will be some kind of cooperative enterprise. Since most of us are not
given all the gifts that are needed for successful business enterprise-
we may have know-how and managerial ability, but not the money-a
group effort is commonly encountered. Once it is decided that the
effort is to be carried forward in some kind of cooperative arrange-
ment, the real choice of business form is presented. Two major
alternatives emerge-corporation or partnership. On the other side,
while a single venturer often carries forward a business in proprietor-
ship form, an alternative almost equally available to him is the possi-
bility of going forward in the form of a corporation which might be
called, if it were not for the special meaning the term has acquired
in the history of corporate law, "a corporation sole."2 A corporation
all of whose shares are owned by a single individual may still be a
viable legal entity, and while nominal incorporators may need to be
multiple, they often have no contemplation of management or owner-
ship in the enterprise, all of whose shares will come to be owned by a
single person.3 It appears then that the fundamental decision is
whether or not the enterprise is going to be a single venture or a
group effort. Once that has been resolved, then in each alternative
there are only two choices of business form rather than the three that
are usually recited. To the single venturer the realistic possibilities
are a proprietorship or a corporation all of whose stock would be
owned by one person. To the joint venturer or the cooperative enter-
prise the choice is twofold again, a partnership or a corporation.
Observe, however, that a single venturer might for tax considerations
choose to use a partnership in order to split income among the family;4
so things are not as simple as they seem. Furthermore, a single
venturer organized in corporate form who spreads stock ownership
among the members of his family may achieve an even more reliable
2. "A corporation sole is one consisting of one person only, and his successors in
some particular station, who are incorporated by law in order to give them some legal
capacities and advantages, particularly that of perpetuity, which in their natural
persons they could not have had. In this sense, the sovereign in England is a sole
corporation, so is a bishop, so are some deans distinct from their several chapters, and so
is every parson and vicar." BLACK, LAW DiCTIoNARY 274 (2d ed. 1910).
3. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.05 (1958), contains an interesting and concise
discussion of one-man corporations, with comprehensive references to cases, statutes,
and law review articles.
4. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 704(e). Regarding family partnerships, see Minn.
6767, 1952-1 Cur. BuLL. 111; Berman & Berman, Partnership or Corporation? Possible
Tax Savings under the 1951 Revenue Act, 57 DIcK L. REv. 208 (1953); McClain,
Family Partnership v. Corporation-Income Tax Aspects, 2 VAND. L. REV. 231 (1949)
(excellent discussion pre-dating the Revenue Act of 1951 which added the predecessor
of § 704(e); White, Taxation of the Family Farm Corporation & Partnership: Variations
on a Theme, 36 N.D.L. REv. 87 (1960); Note, 61 YALE L.J. 541 (1952).
Act of 1951, 61 YALE L.J. 541 (1952).
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method of dividing income, thereby keeping more in lower tax
brackets.5
II. PRIVATE LAw ADVANTAGES OF THE CORPORATE FoRm
Let us canvass very briefly the private law advantages that the
corporate form confers. They are all connected with the rise of the
modem business corporation as a major instrumentality of the capital-
istic system.6 A large enterprise that required an aggregation of
capital also demanded the legal characteristics that have come to be
given to the corporate form. Each of them clearly is connected with
the function of a corporation as a large capital gathering mechanism,
making possible ventures that no single person could undertake, or
would wisely undertake if his personal and business estate were at
risk. In other words, the characteristics of corporate form that the
law confers derive largely from the needs of big business. Yet, of
course, they are not restricted to big business but are, under our
modem general corporation laws, available to a very small business
owned by a small number of people or even by only one.
What are the chief characteristics that are conferred by corporate
existence?7 First and foremost is limited liability, which the British
denote when they designate their corporations as "Ltd." In the case
of a close corporation whose shareholders frequently must pledge
their own credit to back up corporate borrowing, one might
question how far this feature is illusory. Two observations will suffice
to demonstrate that limited liability is not totally illusory even to the
close corporation. In the first place, general creditors on trade
accounts and wages are not able to reach the assets of the investors
but are limited to the amount of the corporation's capital. Secondly,
tort liability, which is even a more serious risk, can be buffered by
the existence of a corporation. Is insurance an adequate answer to
that? One Tax Court judge remarked a few years ago that this risk
could be covered by insurance so that the multiple corporations in
that particular case were not justified.8 But little experience is re-
quired for one to appreciate how limited is the protection that insur-
5. But, cf. Overton v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1947).
6. For an excellent historical summary, see 1 DODD & BAKER, CASES ON BUSINESS
ASSOCIATIONS: CORpoRATIoNS 1-37 (1940).
7. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1960), as amended, T.D. 6797, 1965 INT. REV. BULL.
No. 9, at 38 (1965), contains an excellent, although in some areas controversial,
analysis of corporate characteristics. See also Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344
(1935).
8. Aldon Homes, Inc., 33 T.C. 582, 598 (1959). The court observed that the
investors already had one corporate shield and questioned whether their multiplication




ance affords. Certainly it is true that liability insurance is needed.
Every corporation (and every partnership) would want to have it.
But to say that it would be an answer to the problem of limited
liability and thereby make the partnership equally attractive is cer-
tainly unrealistic. Not only may the coverage of the policy not
extend to the particular risk from which loss arises, but the monetary
limits on the policy may cause protection to fail when it is needed
the most.9 Therefore, even in the case of close-held corporations,
while limited liability may not be quite so limited as it first appears
to be, it is still a significant factor that must weigh heavily in the
balance when choosing between the corporation and the partnership
or proprietorship.
Next is free transferability of interests. This characteristic makes it
possible for an investor to gain a shift in his investment, to recoup
his investment really, without having to destroy the venture that is
going forward. He simply lets someone else take over and stand in
his shoes. From the viewpoint of our industrial economy this feature
serves to enhance mobility of capital. But the fact is that the share-
holds of close corporations do not want this particular feature.
This one above all is shunned. The typical pattern involves a con-
genial group, perhaps all related to each other, who do not wish to
admit a stranger within the gate. Much legal effort is expended in
designing and implementing buy-sell restrictions that effectively keep
the shares from being freely transferable-the "first offer" and "first
refusal" arrangements. 10 Closely held enterprises would not choose the
corporate form for this feature, unless the organizers desired access
to the capital market through a public offering of stock. Since this
generally undesirable incident of corporate form can be effectively
limited by contractual restrictions (often wisely incorporated into the
articles of incorporation or by-laws) free transferability of interests
may be considered a neutral factor in the choice of form for closely
held enterprises.
The third corporate characteristic is centralized management, which
serves to accomplish the separation of ownership from management.
9. Consider the hypothetical case of a truck which collides with a school bus full
of children, or a limousine carrying six $100,000 per year executives, used by
Professor Hartman in an address before the Tennessee Oil Men's Association. Address
by Professor Paul J. Hartman, Tennessee Oil Men's Ass'n, Nov. 19, 1963.
10. O'NEAL, op. cit. supra note 3, at 2-80; Barron, Validity and Enforcement of
Various Types of Restrictions on Share Transfer and Buy-Out Arrangements in Ohio,
31 U. Cnc. L. REV. 266 (1962). BicKEL, Keeping a Close Corporation Close, 23 Ohio
Bar 537 (1960); O'NnAL, Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely-Held Corporations,
65 HAIv. L. Bnv. 773 (1952). For a general discussion of the tax problems in-
volved, see Strecker, Corporate Buy-Sell Agreements: Tax Problems in Drafting, 15
WAsia. & LEE L. REv. 18 (1958), reprinted as a tax classic in 9 Tax Cou s. Q. 325
(1965).
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In the case of many close corporations this is totally inappropri-
ate. These entrepreneurs want to unite ownership and management
because they all intend to be active in the business. However, this
does not characterize all close corporations. Many families own
businesses in which only a few members are active. And here the
corporation serves a very benign purpose in making it possible for the
inactive family members, say the son who decides to become a
doctor instead of going into his father's business, to continue owning
an interest in the business while control may be vested in the other
brother who decided to follow father's footsteps. So centralized
management, while often inappropriate, is sometimes a positive
factor and could in a certain type of case make the corporate form
attractive. But typically this feature, like free transferability, is
neutral and holds no charm for the closely held enterprise.
The fourth corporate characteristic, continuity of life, is closely
allied with the fictional nature of corporate existence. A corporation
continues to exist, in contemplation of law (the only sense in which
a legal corporation, as distinct from a socio-economic entity known
as an "enterprise," can exist), despite the death or withdrawal of any
of its officers, directors, shareholders, or employees. By way of con-
trast, a partnership is technically dissolved by operation of law upon
the death or withdrawal of any partner. The continuity of corporate
life seems to impart a stability and continuing vitality to the enter-
prise. It should be observed that to some extent the continuity of
corporate existence may be a self-validating hypothesis-if we believe
it will tend to become true. But while corporate form may
facilitate continuity of the enterprise, those who have counselled
close corporations realize that the corporate form does not
guarantee the sine qua non of actual continuity of the business-
adequate management succession." Continuity of successful operation
is a much more elusive thing than can be achieved by putting words
on paper and calling it a corporate charter. Also it is true that a
partnership agreement under modem law can give a degree of
continuity of life, though perhaps somewhat more limited. 12 And
indeed, as Professor O'Neal points out in his study of the "squeeze
out" of minority interests in close corporations, continuity of life
may even be a disadvantage from the standpoint of a minority in-
vestor.'3 One representing a person who is going into a venture as a
minor shareholder might very well advise him to go in as a minor
11. See Lawthers, The Fraigle Bark of the Small Corporation, 7 J. Am. Soc'y C.L.U.
4 (1957).
12. UNnwo P s RmSN m AC §§ 31, 40-42.
13. O'NEAL, EXPULSION OF OPPREssioN OF BusuIss ASSOCIATES; "SQUEEZE-OuTs"
w SmALL ENTEaRrISES (1961).
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partner, because a partner can pull out his investment any time he
wishes by a voluntary dissolution. 14 A minority shareholder is locked
in and may be subject to abuse, such as overly conservative dividend
policy designed to discourage him from continuing as a shareholder,
perhaps driving down the value of the stock so that it can be pur-
chased by the majority shareholders at a bargain. This typical
squeeze-out situation is illustrative of the many varieties of what
one reviewer called "man's inhumanity to man" detailed in O'Neal's
work.
When we appraise the considerations involved we find that with
some qualification, the only corporate characteristic of true importance
for the closely held enterprise is limited liability. The matter becomes
more simple than at first it had appeared to be. Free transferability,
generally not desired, can be neutralized. Centralization of manage-
ment is desirable only in selected cases, but in most cases forces what
is really a partnership or proprietorship to adopt cumbersome proce-
dures and/or empty paper work for fear of jeopardizing limited
liability. Continuity of life may help to facilitate continuity of the
enterprise, but must not be allowed to lull the investors into com-
placent disregard of the very practical problem of insuring adequate
management succession.
There are some other non-tax legal compulsions or inducements to
the selection of a particular form of doing business. One, a conse-
quential business advantage resulting from all these corporate char-
acteristics, is improved ability to raise capital. Public sale of stock
is possible and borrowing, whether from individual investors or from
financial institutions, may be facilitated. The strict limitations placed
by the corporate law on the withdrawal of funds by shareholders
assure creditors that at least the amount of stated capital will be
available as a cushion to protect them against loss. And if share-
holders do impair the capital, creditors know that they may recover
the illegal dividends from the shareholder-recipients," or perhaps the
directors.'
6
14. See note 12 supra.
15. Stockholders may not be liable for innocently acquired dividends if they were
paid out when the corporation was solvent. Bartlett v. Smith, 162 Md. 478, 160 Ati.
440, 161 Ati. 509 (1932). For statutes dealing with shareholder liability, see CAL.
CORP. CODE § 1510 (requirement of scienter); Micir. STAT. ANN. § 21.48 (1963);
OHIo REv. CODE § 1701.95(c) (shareholder must have knowingly received them). See
LATTiN, CORPORAoTIONs 492 (1959). Compare N.Y. STOCK CoRn'. LAW § 114, which
holds stockholders of a foreign corporation doing business in New York liable for
unauthorized dividends; Irving Trust Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 83 F.2d 168 (2d Cir.
1936), applies the latter New York law to a transferee of a Delaware corporation.
16. For a director's liability under the common law, see Burke v. Marlboro Awning
Co., 330 Mass. 294, 113 N.E.2d 222 (1953). For statutes dealing with director's
liability, see CAL. CORP. CODE § 825; N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 58 (director not
1700 [ VOL. 18
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Legal compulsion is illustrated by the familiar case of the doctor
or lawyer who is precluded by state law and ethical considerations
from use of the corporate form. 7 Recent state legislation authorizing
formation of professional associations or corporations has made
considerable inroads on this traditional taboo.'8
III. ADVANTAGES OF PARTNERSHIPS
What advantages does the partnership possess? A prevailing opinion
seems to be that it is less expensive to form a partnership than a
corporation. Since the major element of expense is the attorney's
fee, this might vary from one part of the country to another. But to
the extent that the attorney's fee is based on time, effort, and skill
required, a conscientious lawyer might well feel that he should charge
as much (or more) for a complex partnership agreement as he would
for a fairly well standardized corporate formation. And if tax con-
siderations are given their due share of attention, there is some
evidence that more difficulty will be encountered in counselling on
the less familiar but not less complex tax problems in drafting part-
nership agreements. 19
What tax advantages does a partnership offer? A minor one is that
the partnership is a more perfect conduit, not changing the tax
character of the income which passes through it.20 Thus, tax-exempt
liable if reasonably believed dividend distribution would not impair capital); OHio
REV. CODE §§ 1701.33-.95(A) (1964); TENN. CODE ANNt. §§ 48-123 to -212
(1964) (director not liable if in good faith relied on balance sheet and other
accounting means of corporation). See BAKER & CARY, CASES AND MATERALS ON
ConponAnoNs 619-25 (3d ed. 1959); LAIN, CORPORAnONs 490 (1959).
17. The Ohio Supreme Court has held the Ohio Professional Association Act un-
constitutional insofar as it attempted to authorize the practice of law in contravention
to rule XIV of that court's rules of practice, which permits only natural persons to
be admitted to practice. State ex rel. Green v. Brown, 173 Ohio St. 114, 180 N.E.2d
157 (1962); Note, 31 U. CGic. L. BEv. 341 (1962).
18. A recent count indicated that 33 states had adopted legislation designed to
permit the formation of professional associations or corporations to carry on various
professional callings. See Bittker, Professional Associations and Federal Income Taxa-
tion: Some Questions and Comments, 17 TAx L. REv. 1 (1961); Ebner, Pros and
Cons of Professional Association Acts, 15 J. TAXATON 308 (1961); Grayk, Professional
Associations and the Kintner Regulations: Some Answers, More Questions, and Further
Comments, 17 TAx L. REv. 469 (1962); Maier, Dort Confuse Kintner-Type Associa-
tions With New Professional Corporations, 15 J. TAXA-TON 248 (1961); Scallen, Federal
Income Taxation of Professional Associations and Corporations, 49 MwN. L. REV. 603
(1965); Snyder & Weckstein, Quasi-Corporations, Quasi-Employees, and Quasi-Tax
Relief for Professional Persons, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 613 (1963).
19. WILLIS, PA TNERsmp TAXATiON (1957); Willis, Drafting Partnership Agreements:
the General Lawyer's Responsibility for Income Tax Consequences under the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, 16 MONT. L. REv. 44 (1955); 26 PA. BAR Ass'N Q. 185 (1955);
9 Wyo. L.J. 106 (1955).
20. Caplin, Partnership or S Corporation? A Check List of the Tax Factors in the
Choice, 12 J. TAXAUON 32 (1960).
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municiple bond interest or tax-favored long-term capital gains
received by a partner will still retain their original indentity.21 These
same items received by a corporation increase its "earnings and profits"
and will ordinarily be treated as dividend income, taxable at ordinary
rates, when distributed to the shareholders.22  Subchapter S treat-
ment goes some distance, but not all the way, toward equalizing the
postion of partners and shareholders with respect to the pass-through
of items having a special and favorable tax status at the entity level.23
The tax laws of many states impose franchise and/or income taxes
on corporations only, which of course are avoided by use of the
partnership form. Since these taxes are usually not high, this may
be considered a minor tax advantage.24
A major tax advantage of the partnership is involved in what might
be called "loss planning." Those counselling the investors in pros-
pective business ventures have a unique opportunity and responsi-
bility to lend objective judgment as to the likelihood of success. The
investors have spent weeks or months persuading themselves
that the venture will be profitable. Not that counsel should be
pessimistic; too much of that may persuade the investors that their
attorney is representing the other side and they may seek other advice.
But counsel owes it to his client to point out the possibility (however
remote) that the venture will fail and the investment, or part of it,
will be lost. If planning will permit the loss to be recognized for tax
purposes in the most favorable way, the risk of loss is somewhat buf-
fered and the transaction becomes a better bet. While obviously
loss planning will never supersede planning for profit, insofar as it can
be done without jeopardizing other more important objectives, it
should be given due consideration.
What is favorable loss treatment? There are three criteria, each
of which is illustrated by an example. Ideally, the deduction should
be (1) certain, (2) favorably treated, and (3) early. Uncertainty
surrounds the future deductibility of a corporate net operating loss
carryback or carryforward, since if the corporation never becomes
21. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 702.
22. Treas. Reg. § 1.312-6 (1955).
23. Caplin, supra note 20; Lourie, Subchapter S After Six Years of Operation: An
Analysis of Its Advantages and Defects, 22 J. TAXAnoN 166 (1965).
24. Micff. STAT. ANN. § 21.205 (1963) ("five mills upon each dollar of its paid-up
capital and surplus . "); N.Y. TAx LAw § 210 (Supp. 1965) ("computed at rate
of four and one-half per centum on its entire net income .. .or (2) computed at one
mill for each dollar of its total business and investment capital ...."); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 72, § 1871 (a)-(b) (Supp. 1964) ("five mills upon each dollar of the actual
value of its whole capital stock of all kinds . . ."). For comparison of rates of
corporate income tax, see Special Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate Com-
merce of the House Committee on the Judiciary, State Taxation of Interstate Com-
merce, H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 105-07 (1964).
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profitable, there will be no income against which the loss can be
offset.2 And if a corporation ceases business after several years of
losses, the benefit of that tax history cannot, generally, be passed on
to others.26 Also, any benefit is postponed until profit appears at
the corporate level.
Deduction of the shareholder's loss on his investment is postponed
until the year he sells the shares at a loss or until the year in which the
stock became worthless.2 7 Disputes frequently arise over the proper
year, and deduction in too late a year can lead to forfeiting the de-
duction since the period of limitations on refunds may have elapsed. 28
Even when deduction is taken, it yields the limited benefit accorded
capital losses, and can only be offset against capital gains (if any);
otherwise only 1,000 dollars per year will be deducted from ordinary
income, with a carryover for an indefinite number of years.29 While
section 1244 allows ordinary loss treatment on the sale or worthlessness
of "small business corporation stock" within strict dollar limitations,
the deduction is still postponed until the year of sale or worthlessness.
The use of debt in the capital structure might in exceptional cases
permit deduction against ordinary income as a "business bad debt," but
generally the worthless debt will yield capital loss merely.30 In addi-
tion, this capital loss is postponed until the year of worthlessness.31
The choice of corporate form (absent election under subchapter S)32
offers a cheerless prospect from the standpoint of loss planning.
A partnership net operating loss passes through to be deducted
on the partners' returns almost as the loss is being incurred, and
against ordinary income to boot.33 Loss is given tax recognition sooner,
more surely, and more favorably than the investors in the incor-
porated venture.
A final tax advantage of the partnership might tip the scales in a
doubtful case. Taxwise, formation of a partnership is less of a
commitment than formation of a corporation. While the formation
25. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 172.
26. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 269, 381-82, 482.
27. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 165 (particularly subsection).
28. Ainsley Corp. v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1964); Industrial Rayon
Corp. v. Commissioner, 94 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1938); Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v.
Harrison, 63 F. Supp. 495 (N.D. IMI. 1945); 5 MER=mNS, FEDERAL INcOmE TAXAnON
§ 26.97 (rev. ed. 1963); Comment, 18 VAND. L. REv. 814 (1965). Section 6511(d)(1)
of the Code provides an extended (7 year) period of limitations on refunds based on
bad debts and worthless securities.
29. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1211-12.
30. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 166; Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193 (1963).
31. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 166.
32. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1371-77. See also text accompanying notes 114-
124 infra.
33. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 702.
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of either a partnership or a corporation is generally nontaxable, 4
the liquidation of a corporation,35 unlike the liquidation of a partner-
ship,36 is normally a taxable event. Thus, if a corporation is formed
and it is later decided that a partnership would serve the parties'
needs better, tax may be incurred on gains accruing over many years
(even before the corporate formation) by reason of the corporate
liquidation incident to switching to partnership form. On the other
hand, if a partnership is formed at first, and later converted into a
corporation, no tax will ordinarily be incurred upon the partnership
liquidation incident to formation of the new corporation. And since
loss may be more likely in the first years, initial choice of a partner-
ship would be supported by early, certain and favorable treatment of
loss.
IV. MiNoR TAx ADvANTAGEs OF THE CORPORATE Fomi
The numerous minor (but not unimportant) tax advantages of the
corporate form arise from the fact that shareholders of a corporation
can also be employees of the corporation, while neither partners nor
sole proprietors can qualify as employees of their partnership or pro-
prietorship. 37 They are, of course, self-employed. The many so-called
fringe benefits are available only to employees. The term "fringe
benefits," however, is ambiguous and includes two distinct types of
tax benefits which are extended to employees. One class, which
might be denominated "nontaxable compensation" comprises numerous
special economic benefits which may be given to employees without
any resulting tax burden, immediate or future. The other class of
fringe benefits is "deferred compensation," in a broad sense including
any arrangement whereby the tax upon employee benefits is postponed
until a taxable year later-sometimes many years later than the year
in which the services were rendered.
A. Nontaxable Compensation
The following are the more commonly encountered items of non-
taxable compensation.
1. Meals and Lodging.-If furnished for the convenience of the
employer, as in the case of a hotel manager who must remain on call
34. INrT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 351, 721 (corporations and partnerships, respec-
tively).
35. INT. BEV. CODE OF 1954, § 331.
36. Irr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 731.
37. See G.C.M. 6582, VIII-2 Cum. BULL. 200 (1929).
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at all times, the value of meals and lodging is -excluded from gross
income for tax purposes. 8
2. Moving Expense.-Prior to 1964 the case law had established ex-
clusion of reimbursement for direct moving expenses of an employee
who remained with the same employer.39 Doubt surrounded inci-
dental items such as reimbursement for real estate commission and
for loss on sale of personal residence, the courts tending to hold such
reimbursements taxable compensation. 40 And all expense reimburse-
ments, even those for direct moving costs, were taxable to the
employee who changed employers as well as location. 41 The Revenue
Act of 1964 erased this latter distinction and made specifically ex-
cludable if reimbursed, and deductible if not reimbursed, the direct
moving costs of employees, even those who do not remain with the
same employer.
42
3. Group Term Life Insurance.-The regulations have for many
years allowed an employer to furnish group term life insurance pro-
tection without requiring the employee to pay tax on the value of this
coverage.43 Abuse was said to have arisen where very high-salaried
executives were given coverage ranging into six figures. The Revenue
Act of 1964 limited to 50,000 dollars the amount of coverage for any
individual which can qualify for exclusion in the future. The cost of
providing coverage in excess of that amount will be taxable compen-
sation.44
4. Split-Dollar Life Insurance.-Beginning in 1955, the Internal
Revenue Service ruled that no income to an employee would result
from provision of insurance coverage under the "split-dollar" ar-
38. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 119; Arthur Benaglia, 36 B.T.A. 838 (1937), appeal
dismissed, 97 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1938).
39. Rev. Rul. 54-429, 1954-2 Cum. BuLL. 53; S. RiEP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
71-73 (1964). A decision by the Tax Court permitting deduction of unreimbursed
moving expenses has recently been reversed. Commissioner v. Mendel, P-H Am. FED.
TAx REP. 2d 5796 (4th Cir. 1965), reversing Walter H. Mendel, 41 T.C. 32 (1963).
40. Bradley v. Commissioner, 324 F.2d 610 (4th Cir. 1963), affirming Harris W.
Bradley, 39 T.C. 652 (1963), overruling Otto Sorg Schairer, 9 T.C. 549 (1947). In
Bradley, the court found that payment made by the employer in reimbursing an
old employee for loss incurred on the sale of his residence, after the employee's move
to the new employment site, was additional compensation and taxable. In Arthur J.
Kobacker, 37 T.C. 882 (1962), it was held even before the Tax Court overruled
Schairer that this was taxable income for a new employee who was reimbursed for
moving to his new employment site. England v. United States, 345 F.2d 414 (7th
Cir. 1965) petition for cert. filed, 34 U.S.L. WEE 3091 (U.S. Sept. 23, 1965); Willis
B. Ferebee, 39 T.C. 801 (1963) (reimbursed real estate commission taxable). Rev.
Rul. 64-153, 1964-1 Cur. BULL. 70.
41. Koons v. United States, 315 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1963); Willis B. Ferebee, 39
T.C. 801 (1963); see Finance Committee Report, supra note 39.
42. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 217.
43. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(2) (1963).
44. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 79.
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rangement.45 Essentially the plan involves the joint ownership by the
employer and the employee of a policy on the life of the employee.
The employer owns the amount representing the cash surrender value,
and the employee's named beneficiaries have the right to the balance,
representing interest and the mortality gain. The employer and em-
ployee also contribute to the premium cost in the same proportion.
That is, the employer pays an amount equal to the annual increase in
the cash surrender value, and the employee pays the balance. This
arrangement may make available a large amount of insurance coverage
at very moderate cost, although as time goes by, the advantage re-
cedes. The reasoning of the Service was that while the employee
received an economic advantage, it was analogous to the employer
lending money to the employee without charging interest, a transaction
not thought to give rise to realized income.46 While no reference was
made to Eisner v. Macomber,47 the constitutional requirement of
"realization," stemming from that decision, might not be met in this
transaction. The analogy to an interest-free loan arises since the
insurance company's possession of the employer's funds representing
the cash surrender value enables it to earn income which helps reduce
the premium cost.
Among the recommendations for tax revision proposed by Treasury
Secretary Dillon in 1963 was the suggestion that the economic ad-
vantage conferred upon the employee should be included in taxable
income.48 While Congress did not adopt this recommendation, the
Internal Revenue Service has recently announced revocation of the
favorable 1955 ruling, its position now being similar to that advocated
by Secretary Dillon. For policies purchased after November 13, 1964,
the employee must include in income the value of the insurance pro-
tection afforded in excess of premiums paid by him.49 The approach
is essentially the "economic benefit' theory which has been employed
previously to tax pre-paid annuity contracts furnished to employees.50
The new ruling holds that the arrangement is not essentially similar
to an interest-free loan, as at first believed.
45. Rev. Rul. 55-713, 1955-2 Cum . BULL. 23.
46. J. Simpson Dean, 35 T.C. 1083 (1963); Smith-Bridgman Company, 16 T.C.
287 (1951); Rev. Rul. 55-713, supra note 45. But see Proposed Treas. Reg. § 482,
30 Fed. Reg. 4256 (1965), attributing interest to the borrower in transactions between
related trades or business. •
47. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
48. The proposal was that "the earnings on the employer's cash surrender value
which are applied to purchase insurance protection for the employee would be taxable
to the employee as additional compensation." Hearings before the House Committee
on Ways and Means, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 112-13 (1963).
49. Rev. Rul. 64-328, 1964-2 Cum. BULL. 11.
50. United States v. Drescher, 179 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
821 (1950); Renton K. Brodie, 1 T.C. 275 (1942).
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In determining the value of the insurance protection provided, ap-
parently reference will be made to the cost of term insurance in the
amount of the coverage afforded the employee. Since the employee
actually is purchasing a policy of permanent insurance (although
he cannot receive the cash surrender value) the actual economic value
of the benefit may exceed the tax value, so that there is a residual
advantage in the continued use of this device even under the recent
Treasury ruling. Furthermore, there is much to be said in favor of the
original analogy to an interest-free loan, despite the Service's change
of position. Some courts may eventually show their preference for
this analysis, particularly since there is more than a hint of a consti-
tutional issue involved. It might be felt that Congress, and not the
Treasury Department (even though the House Committee remitted
the question to the Treasury Department for further study and pos-
sible administrative action) 51 should make such a bold inroad on
the realization doctrine.
On the other hand, it is clear that the Supreme Court is willing to
find realization where it otherwise would not be found, when the
special relationship of employer-employee exists. The leading case
to this effect is Commissioner v. LoBue,52 where the Court held that
while a bargain purchase of property does not usually give rise to
realized income, purchase of the employer's stock at a price below
its fair market value could be realized income as a form of compen-
sation. And apparently, no subjective inquiry is to preclude such
characterization. If an employee purchases property from his em-
ployer at a bargain price, compensation characterization will be in-
ferred. Recitals that the purpose was to give the employee a pro-
prietary interest in the employer-corporation in order to ensure in-
dustry and loyalty, formerly effective to rebut the compensation char-
acterization, were not given effect.
Even when the Treasury Department was ruling favorably on split-
dollar arrangements generally, it was widely reported that such ruling
would be withheld in the case of an employee who was also a share-
holder, the typical close-corporation situation. The reasoning behind
this is difficult to fathom, since it would seem that there is no more
basis for arguing that realization occurs when a corporation confers
an economic benefit upon a shareholder (dividend) than when an
employer confers an economic benefit upon an employee (compensa-
51. H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1963); S. REP. No. 830, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1964). "Your Committee believed that the issues involved in
this problem, and the proper solution, including the possibility of administrative
action, are in need of further study by the Treasury Department."
52. 351 U.S. 243 (1956). For a comparison of this case with Commissioner v.
Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960), see note 74 infta.
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tion). Perhaps the availability of two strings to its bow explains
the Treasury Department's reluctance to extend what now is regarded
as an overly generous ruling.
In view of the doubts which might be entertained as to the cor-
rectness of the Treasury's position as a matter of law, and also taking
into view the residual advantage even under the 1964 ruling, split-
dollar arrangements will continue to be used, at least until their legal
status is clarified by court decisions. Appraising the risk overall,
some will feel that continued use of the device may not be worth-
while since it is sure to be challenged and may lead to expensive
litigation.
5. Interest-Free Loans.-Whatever the status of split-dollar life
insurance, there is much support for the position that no income is
realized by an employee who is allowed the use of funds belonging
to his employer without being required to pay interest.5 3 Undeniably
there is an economic benefit which might be measured by the pre-
vailing rate of interest charged by financial institutions on loans
involving similar risk. And the Revenue Act of 1964 establishes a
precedent for taxation of disguised interest in deferred payment trans-
actions on which no "interest" is charged.54 But the Tax Court has
upheld the nontaxability of an interest-free loan made be a close
corporation to its shareholders,55 and the constitutional requirement
of realization may also be cited in support of the same conclusion. 5
One reason why the courts are reluctant to find imputed interest
to the borrower is the paradox that the lender may also be alleged
to have imputed income equal to the interest he should have received.57
While the Service has revoked its favorable 1955 ruling on split-
dollar insurance, the reasoning rejects the analogy to interest-free
loans, not the underlying premise that interest-free loans are non-
taxable. On the question whether realization occurs, see the preceding
discussion of split-dollar insurance.
6. Sick Pay.-Pursuant to President Eisenhower's recommendation,
Congress in 1954 adopted the policy of excluding from an employee's
gross income an amount, not exceeding a rate of 100 dollars per
week, paid by the employer during the employee's illness.58 Amounts
paid during the first seven days of illness were taxable unless the
53. See note 46, supra and accompanying text.
54. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 483.
55. J. Simpson Dean, supra note 46.
56. Eisner v. Macomber, supra note 47.
57. The contention was rejected in Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 34 T.C. 416 (1960);
Society Brand Clothes, Inc., 18 T.C. 304 (1952); and in Combs Lumber Co., 41 B.T.A.
339 (1940).
58. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 105(d).
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employee were hospitalized or had suffered personal injuries. Presi-
dent Kennedy in 1963 recommended repeal of this exclusion. 5
Congress' decision was to restrict it somewhat more, but to retain
the essential provision. During the first thirty days of absence from
work, the payments must not exceed seventy-five per cent of the
regular weekly rate. Also, the former seven day waiting period is
continued. One difficult question has been the extent to which a
"plan" is needed, and what degree of formality of communication
is required to establish a "plan."60 Also, where one retires early due
to sickness or injury, some part of the pension received may qualify
as "sick pay."
61
7. Medical Insurance and Reimbursement.-It has been suggested
that use of the corporate form may permit circumvention of the
present limitations on deductibility of medical expense.62 The reason-
ing is that the corporation is permitted to deduct, and the employee
need not report as income, the cost of medical insurance furnished
to the employee, or the amounts which represent reimbursement of
medical expense incurred by the employee, his spouse and depend-
ents.63 Exclusion is the same in effect as deduction, and the 3 per
cent of adjusted gross income "floor" which applies to medical ex-
pense deductions by individual taxpayers6 is not encountered. Similar
questions as to the need for a "plan" may arise here as in the case
of sick pay.
8. Employee Death Benefits.-For many years it has been customary
for close corporations and others to. make some kind of payment
to the widow or other heirs of deceased former employees. Among
other things, continuation of the salary, or a portion of it, for a year
or two, has been quite common. The tax status of these payments,
both to the recipient and to the payor, has had a checkered history.
6 5
59. Hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means, supra note 48, at 20.
60. Treas. Reg. § 1.105-5 (1964); John C. Lang, 41 T.C. 352 (1963), 17 VAND. L.
REv. 1549 (1964); Chism v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1963). But see
Niekamp v. United States, 240 F. Supp. 195 (E.D. Mo. 1965); Andress v. United
States, 198 F. Supp. 371 (N.D. Ohio 1961).
61. Commissioners v. Winter, 303 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1962). Compare Corkum v.
United States, 204 F. Supp. 471 (D. Mass. 1962).
62. Note, 33 ST. JoHNs's L. REv. 187, 204 (1958).
63. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 105.
64. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 213.
65. Calechman, Recent Payments-to-Widows Cases Stress Facts, 14 J. TAXATON 308
(1961); Crown, Payments to Corporate Executives' Widows, N.Y.U. 19TH INST. oNr
FED. TAx. 815 (1961); DiehI, Payments to Widows of Corporate Employees, 1960 So.
CALiF. TAx IN sT. 491; Getz, Payments to Widow Not Taxed in First 1954 Code Case,
11 J. TAxATIoN 229 (1959); Gewanter, Employee Death Benefits, N.Y.U. 21ST INST.
ON FE TAx 523 (1963); Griswold, Of Time and Attitudes, 74 HAzv. L. REV. 81, 88
(1960); Yohlin, Payments to Widows of Employees, 40 TAXE 208 (1962) (excellent
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At one time, the Service took the view that since the payments were
made to one who had rendered no service to the payor, they were not
compensation. 6 And within reasonable limits as to duration and
amount, the theoretically inconsistent deduction was also permitted. 7
In 1950, the Service reviewed its former position and reversed itself.
Since the payments would not have been made were it not for the
former rendition of services, they are compensation even though
remitted to another than the person who earned them. 8 Shortly
thereafter, in the Revenue Act of 1951, Congress was persuaded
that the analogy to life insurance should render these payments, with-
in dollar limits, nontaxable.69 They are somewhat like self-insured
life insurance, the employer carrying the risk himself rather than fund-
ing it. The limit selected was 5,000 dollars but inadvertent wording
permitted the result that if one had more than one employer, multiple
exclusions would be available. In the revenue revision which led
to the enactment of section 101(b) of the 1954 Code, the 5,000
dollar exclusion was clearly limited to one per employee, and the
requirement of a "contract" was deleted. In the meanwhile, many
taxpayers were vigorously contesting the Service's change of posi-
tion, asserting in numerous litigated cases that the payments were
made out of concern for the widow's welfare and motivated by
affection for her-excludable under section 102 as gifts.70 Taxpayer
success in this area was mixed. Numerous lower courts were re-
ceptive,71 though not so the Tax Court.7 2 A number of appellate
recapitulation); Note, 17 J. TAxATIoN 228 (1962); Note, 49 Ky. L.J. 531 (1961);
Note, 27 TEN. L. REV. 314 (1960).
66. I.T. 3329, 1939-2 Cum. BULL. 153.
67. See Income Tax Reg. 118, § 39.23(a)-9 (1953), for the formulation in effect
immediately before the 1954 Code. It is said that this position was taken in the
regulations since the Revenue Act of 1918. McLaughlin Gormley King Co., 11 T.C.
569 (1948). Under the 1954 Code, the statement is found in Income Tax Reg. §
1.404(a)-12 (1956).
68. I.T. 4027, 1950-1 Cum. BULL. 9, revoking I.T. 3329, 1939-2 Cums. BULL. 153.
69. Int. Rev. Code of 1939 § 22(b)(1(B), as amended, ch. 521, 65 Stat. 452
(1951) (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 101(b). See Nelson, New $5,000 Death
Beneft, 31 TAXEs 629 (1953).
70. Bounds v. United States, 262 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1958); Rodner v. United
States, 149 F. Supp. 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
71. Fanning v. Conley, 65-1 CCH U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9404 (D. Conn. 1965); Peters v.
United States, 63-2 CCH U.S. Tax Cas. f1 9512 (D. Minn. 1963); Schleyer v. United
States, 63-2 CCH U.S. Tax Cas. if 9539 (E.D. Mo. 1963); Corasaniti v. United States,
212 F. Supp. 229 (D. Md. 1962); Taylor v. United States, 62-2 CCH U.S. Tax Cas. f1
9828 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Vaughn v. United States, 62-2 CCH U.S. Tax Cas. II 9688
(S.D. Ga. 1962); Schwartz v. United States, 62-2 CCH U.S. Tax Cas. II 9661 (N.D.
Tex. 1962); Palmer v. Mathis, 62-2 CCH U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9636 (D. Ark. 1962); Rico
v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Wis. 1961); Wilner v. United States, 195
F. Supp. 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). Contra, Landry v. United States, 227 F. Supp. 631,
(E.D. La. 1964); McCarthy v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 605 (D. Mass. 1964);
Ossip v. United States, 63-2 CCH U.S. Tax Cas. U 9835 (W.D. Pa. 1963); Browne v.
United States, 63-2 CCH U.S. Tax Cas. U 9696 (D. Mass. 1963); Bacon v. United
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courts passed on the quesction, a majority of them now finding for
the Government. 3 However, since the question is one of fact, much
deference will be given to the lower court decision, as required by
recent Supreme Court decisions on gift versus compensation. 4 The
question is complicated by differences of view among the appellate
courts as to the proper scope of review, and the fact-law paradox.
Some appellate courts feel that if the evidentiary facts-documents,
et cetera-are not in dispute, an appellate court is in as good a posi-
tion as the trial court to draw an intelligent inference as to the
legal characterization of the transaction-gift or compensation.
7 5
States, 64-1 CCH U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9163 (E.D. Ky. 1963); Carson v. United States,
317 F.2d 370 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
72. Katherine Shaw Dickson, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1161 (1964); Ida Maltzman,
23 CCII Tax Ct. Mem. 829 (1964); Estate of Doumakes, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
1247 (1963); Irene M. Waters, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1258 (1063); Estate of Louis
Rosen, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 316 (1962); Margaret H. D. Penick, 37 T.C. 999
(1962), appeal dismissed per stipulation, CCH 1965 STAND. FED. TAX REP. II 644.4741
(3d Cir. 1964); Estate of Cooper, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 774 (1961). Compare Estate
of William Enyart, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1447 (1965), in which $10,000 paid to the
widow of a former employee was held excludable as a gift under § 102. The $5,000
death benefit exclusion of § 101(b) was applied against other post-death compensation
payments received.
73. Courts of Appeal finding such payments to be gifts, as listed by circuits, are:
Greentree v. United States, 338 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1964); Poyner v. Commissioner,
301 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1962); United States v. Pixton, 326 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1964),
32 U. CnTc. L. Rv. 108 (1963); Estate of Martin Kuntz, Sr. v. Commissioner, 300
F.2d 849 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962); United States v. Frankel, 302
F.2d 666 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962); Estate of Olsen v. Commis-
sioner, 302 F.2d 671 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962); United States v.
Kassynski, 284 F.2d 143 (10th Cir. 1960).
Courts of Appeal, listed by circuits, finding such payments to be taxable are: Wright
v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1964); Findlay v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d
620 (2d Cir. 1964); Gaugler v. United States, 312 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1963); Smith
v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 778 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 904 (1962); Martin
v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 290 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 904 (1962);
Froehlinger v. United States, 331 F.2d 849 (4th Cir. 1964); Tomlinson v. Hine, 329
F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1964); Evans v. Commissioner, 330 F.2d 518 (6th Cir. 1964);
Fritzel v. United States, 339 F.2d 995 (7th Cir. 1964); Cronheim's Estate v. Com-
missioner, 323 F.2d 706 (8th Cir. 1963). Note the splits in 4th, 5th, 6th, and 8th
circuits. These splits may be more apparent than real, however, because of factual
distinctions.
74. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960). Note the comment by Dean
Griswold, supra note 65, to the effect that lower courts and the bar need more direct
guidance in this area than furnished by the Court. There seems at first glance to be
some inconsistency between the subjective test of Duberstein and the more objective
approach exemplified in Commissioner v. LoBue, supra note 52. However, in LoBue the
question concerned only the interpretation of the general definition of gross income in
the predecessor of § 61, there being no basis for the contention that the bargain purchase
was a gift. In Duberstein, the issue was the tension between § 61 and § 102, the
latter more clearly calling for a subjective inquiry into the motive for the benefit
conferred.
75. Bounds v. United States, supra note 70. More recently, following the Duberstein
decision, that court (the Fourth Circuit, similarly speaking through Chief Judge
Sobeloff), regards the Bounds case as utilizing "a now unacceptable standard for
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Others feel that the proper division of labor between the trial court
and the appellate court requires deference to the trial court's con-
clusion on questions of ultimate fact, such as whether the employer
intended to make a gift.
76
The final turn of the screw seems to have been performed in
1962 when Congress adopted the twenty-five dollar limit on "business
gifts." 77 This provision will apparently apply to bring this result. If
the employer claims deduction for amounts in excess of the 5,000
dollar exclusion plus twenty-five dollars paid to beneficiaries of de-
ceased former employees, the amount must be considered compen-
sation, tax must be withheld, and the amount reported as wages.
The amount which is excludable as a death benefit under section
101(b) is not considered a gift for this purpose. The recipient will be
permitted to exclude 5,000 dollars but the balance will be taxable
unless the taxpayer is able to establish, probably by litigation if at
all, that the payment was a gift. This litigation could indirectly
jeopardize the payor's deduction. On the other hand, if the payor
wishes to support the position of the recipient, he must sacrifice
deduction on his part. It seems likely that most employers will
choose to deduct the amounts, tending to commit the recipient to
taxability on amounts over 5,000 dollars. It is conceivable that a
controlled close corporation might see fit to sacrifice its deduction
at the corporate rates in favor of exclusion by a high-bracket share-
holder-recipient. The success of this seems unlikely, since the share-
holder status furnishes an additional argument against gift characteri-
zation, although not all shareholder-recipients have been taxed.
78
But it is arguable that the interests of the corporation have been
impaired for the benefit of a particular shareholder, and creditors
or minority shareholders might be able to attack the transaction
successfully.79 Since counsel for the close-held corporation is likely
review." Poyner v. Commissioner, supra note 73, at 290 n.5. Contrast the approach of
the Sixth Circuit in Kuntz v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 849 (6th Cir. 1962). The court
recognized that the "clearly erroneous" rule applies to inferences from undisputed
facts, but still found that a gift intent was the only reasonable inference from the
factual pattern there presented.
76. Poyner v. Commissioner, supra note 73.
77. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 274(b), added by 76 Stat. 960 (1962). See 16
ABA, SECTnON OF TAxAnON BULL. No. 2, Point to Remember No. 6 (Jan. 1963).
78. Compare Schner-Block Co. v. Commissioner, 329 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1964), with
Pizitz, Inc. v. Patterson, 64-2 CCH U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9526 (N.D. Ala. 1964). See also
Yohlin, supra note 65, at 216.
79. Compare Spirt v. Bechtel, 129 F. Supp. 872 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd in part and
reo'd in part, 232 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1956), raising a similar argument against corpo-
rate waiver of deduction under a restricted stock option plan pursuant to § 421(a) (2)
before the 1964 amendments. Counsel's opinion that the claim for deduction was
worthless-the option being non-compensatory-served to protect the directors and




to be the same as counsel for the leading shareholders, what position
should he take on this matter? Does his duty of loyalty to the
corporate client dictate that he advise the corporation to claim the
deduction, even though it may preclude the individual recipient from
claiming exemption?
In addition to claiming that the payments in excess of 5,000 dollars
are taxable to the recipient as compensation, the Service has pursued
another and apparently inconsistent attack on the corporate deduc-
tion. Particularly where the recipient is also a shareholder, it has
been sometimes successfully maintained that the payment was an
informal dividend, and hence nondeductible. Apparently, the Service
is experiencing increasing success in this line of attack, which is
germane even to post-1962 cases.80
For a period, the Service took the position that the 1954 legislation
showed that Congress intended to limit exclusion to 5,000 dollars.81
The argument was not very persuasive when one considers that an
entirely independent Code section excludes gifts from income, and
this is the one on which taxpayers relied. The mere fact that the
exclusion in the life insurance section is limited to 5,000 dollars is
not determinative or even relevant, logically, to an asserted limit apply-
ing to the gift exclusion. Rebuffed by several court decisions, the
Service finally abandoned this position, evidencing nonetheless an
intention to continue to attack the gift characterization on its own
merits.
2
In summation, death benefits not exceeding 5,000 dollars will
continue to receive favorable treatment, both to the payor and the
recipient. Payments in excess of that will have to be characterized
as compensation in order to preserve the corporate deduction. The
taxpayer's chances of being able to receive gift treatment on amounts
over 5,000 dollars, fading under previous law, are further reduced by
the twenty-five dollar limit on business gifts and the accompanying
reporting requirements and commitments.
9. Employee Stock Options.-Suppose that in Year 1, a corporate
employer grants to a selected employee an option to purchase 100
shares of its stock at 100 dollars per share (fair market value) at
80. Interstate Drop Forge Co., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 701 (1963), aff'd, 362 F.2d
743 (7th Cir. 1964); Nickerson Lumber Co. v. United States, 214 F. Supp. 87 (D.
Mass. 1963); Barbourville Brick Co., 37 T.C. 7 (1961); Harry L. Davis Co., 20 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 1043 (1961). But see Rubber Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d
75 (6th Cir. 1964). See also cases cited note 78 supra.
81. Rev. Rul. 58-613 1958-2 Cums. BuLL. 914; Note 9 J. TA.XA 1oN 246 (1958). The
decision was to follow the result reached in Bounds v. United States, supra note 70
(favorable to the taxpayer), for cases arising before the 1954 Code. The position of the
Treasury was reserved as to post-1954 cases.
82. Rev. Rul. 62-102, 1962-2 Cum. BULL. 37.
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any time over the following three years. In Year 3, when the fair
market value of the stock has climbed to 200 dollars, the employee
exercises the option, purchasing 100 shares at 100 dollars each, or
10,000 dollars. By hypothesis, the value of the stock so purchased is
20,000 dollars. Suppose further that in Year 7, when the fair market
value of the stock is 300 dollars per share, the employee sells the
shares on the open market, receiving 30,000 dollars. What tax
consequences flow from these transactions? For many years, the
Service urged that the employee realized ordinary compensation in-
come in the amount of 10,000 dollars in the year the stock was
purchased from the employer. Since the amount included in ordinary
income with respect to the acquisition of property is added to its
cost-basis, 83 the employee would realize 10,000 dollars long term
capital gain (30,000 dollars less 20,000 dollars cost-basis) in the
year of sale. But the lower courts continued to recognize the distinc-
tion between compensatory and proprietary options-the latter being
motivated by the desire to encourage stock ownership, thereby en-
suring the employee's loyalty and effort. Proprietary characteriza-
tion was made more likely if there was little or no "initial spread"-
difference between the option price and fair market value at the time
the option was granted.84
After its victory in Commissioner v. Smith in 1945,85 the Treasury
Department amended the regulations to provide (prospectively)
that any bargain purchase by an employee from an employer resulted
in ordinary income as a form of compensation. 86 The Senate Finance
Committee Report in 1950 stated the Committee's belief that "these
Regulations go beyond the decision of the Supreme Court in
Commissioner v. Smith .. ,"87 Nevertheless, in 1956 that Court
upheld taxability of options despite recitals tending to support
proprietary characterization. It appeared in Commissioner v. LoBue88
that the Court was willing to infer compensatory intent from the
employment relationship, establishing a more objective test. The
present regulations have, since 1961, confirmed this view.89
Meanwhile, Congress was developing a legislative solution to the
problem which was based upon the premise that encouragement of
stock ownership by employees was a wise policy, tending to thwart
83. McCullough v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1946).
84. Delbert B. Geeseman, 38 B.T.A. 258 (1938). See generally Lyon, Employee
Stock Options under the Revenue Act of 1950, 51 CoLm. L. REv. 1 (1951).
85. 324 U.S. 177, rehearing denied 324 U.S. 695 (1945).
86. Treas. Reg. 111 § 29.22(a)-i (1945), as amended, T.D. 5507, 1946-1 Cur,
BULL. 18.
87. S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 59-60 (1950).
88. Supra note 52.
89. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6 (1963).
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the undesirable effects of separation of ownership from management.
The tax law adopted in 1950 implemented this policy in the following
manner 0 If certain requirements related to "restricted stock options"
were met, then the mere grant of the option was to have no immediate
tax effect, a form of nontaxable compensation. Neither was the exer-
cise a taxable event, the "compensation" still being nontaxable. Only
when the shares were sold was a tax imposed, and that tax would
be at the lower capital gain rate. In the example given, the employee
would be taxed on 20,000 dollars of long term capital gain (30,000
dollars less 10,000 dollars cost-basis) with a maximum tax of 5,000
dollars9 imposed in the year of sale. If the employee decided not
to sell the shares, but to hold them and let them pass through his
estate at death, their basis would be "stepped-up" to an amount
equal to their then fair market value, perhaps 30,000 dollars.9 2 They
could be sold by the executor or heir without imposition of any tax
whatever. The effect in this case is truly nontaxable compensation.
The requirement that the option not be transferable except by will
or intestacy gave "restricted stock options" their name. Initial spread
was limited to fifteen per cent (i.e., the option price had to be at least
eighty-five per cent of the value at the time the option was granted),
and if initial spread exceeded five per cent, all initial spread was
treated as compensation income in the year in which the shares were
disposed of, or if held until death, in that year. Shares were required
to be held for more than six months after the exercise of the option,
and could not be disposed of until more than two years from the
date the option was granted, or the favored treatment was forfeited.
Finally, the employee could not own, at the time the option was
granted more than ten per cent of the stock of the corporation,
measured by voting power. If initial spread exceeded fifteen per cent,
the beneficial treatment was entirely withdrawn, and the controlling
case law required inclusion of the spread at the time of exercise as
ordinary income. This meant that close corporations whose stock
was not actively traded could not employ the restricted stock
option to attract high calibre executive talent, since the value of the
stock was not accurately ascertainable. The prohibition on the em-
ployee's owning more than ten per cent of the voting power clearly
precluded use of restricted stock options for the major shareholder-
employees of close corporations.
President Kennedy, in his Tax Message of 1963, recommended
repeal of the favorable treatment given to restricted stock options,
90. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 130A, added by ch. 994, 64 Stat. 906 (1950) (now
INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954, as amended 78 Stat. 19 (1964)).
91. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1201(b).
92. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1014.
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which he regarded as clearly compensation that should be taxed at
ordinary rates.93 The opposition of industry leaders, typified by Henry
Ford, II who testified to the utility of stock options in attracting and
retaining top management personnel (he himself being disqualified
from securing such benefits), persuaded Congress that such drastic
action as that recommended by the President was not required.
4
Remedial change in the existing provisions could eliminate the areas
of abuse without withdrawing from industry this valuable competitive
aid. Two major changes were introduced. The former allowance
of up to fifteen per cent initial spread was removed from the law.
Only if there is zero initial spread may the option qualify as what is
now known as a "qualified stock option." Secondly, the required
holding period was extended from six months to three years from the
date the option is exercised, without reference to the time the option
was granted.
Realizing that the strict requirement of zero initial spread might
prove difficult to meet precisely, in view of the degree of uncertainty
which surrounds stock values in some cases, this provision was softened
in its impact. Whereas before 1964, failure to meet the minimum
option price requirement led to complete forfeiture of the benign
treatment, under the new law some lee-way is permitted, though at a
heavy price. If the option price falls short of the fair market value,
150 per cent of this amount is treated as ordinary income at the time
the option is exercised. 96 To illustrate, if in the foregoing example
the option price had been ninety dollars, then the employee would have
fifteen dollars per share of ordinary income in the year he purchased
the stock, which would be added to the basis of his shares. The
basis being 105 dollars their sale for 300 dollars per share would
yield 105 dollars long term capital gain.
The significance of this lee-way provision (which depends upon
a good faith effort at accurate evaluation) for close corporations
is considerable. Subject to the risk of some amount of ordinary in-
come treatment, qualified employee stock options would seem now
to be available to close corporations for use in attracting quali-
fied executive personnel not presently stockholders in the corpora-
tion. The prohibition against an employee owning more than ten
per cent of the stock has been made even more severe, precluding
93. Op. cit. supra note 48, at 25.
94. Id. pt. 2, at 1127-46.
95. The 1964 amendments led to re-numbering of the § 421 group as follows:
Section 421 of the prior law was re-numbered 424, and retained for options granted
before January 1, 1964. The new rules for "qualified stock options" are contained
in §§ 421, 422, & 425, Section 422 being the main provision. "Employee Stock
Purchase Plans" are dealt with in § 423.
96. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 422(c) (1).
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use of the options for existing shareholder-employees, unless their
holdings do not exceed five per cent. As often in recent years,
Congress kept a friendly eye on small business and softened the
rigor of the five per cent rule for corporations whose equity capital
is less than 2 million dollars. Corporations with equity capital not
exceeding one million dollars are permitted to extend qualified stock
options to employees owning not more than ten per cent, the old
rule being retained for this class of small business corporations. If
equity capital exceeds one million dollars, the percentage is reduced
proportionately.
9 7
In addition to qualified stock options, designed for selected execu-
tive personnel, the 1964 amendments extend favored treatment to
"employee stock purchase plans," under which options are granted
on a wide scale to the non-executive employees, all of whom own
less than five per cent of the stock, measured by voting power or
value. For these plans, the former requirement that the option
price be not less than eighty-five per cent of the fair market value
at the time the option is granted, is retained.98 Close-held corpora-
tions will do well to canvass the possibility of making use of these
formerly unavailable benefits for their employees.
B. Deferred Compensation
Deferred compensation in a broad sense includes any arrangement
whereby the taxability of earned income is postponed to a year later
than the one in which the services were rendered. The term includes
contractual arrangements deferring the receipt of all or a portion
of compensation-deferred compensation in the narrow sense-as well
as "qualified" pension and profit-sharing plans which are extended
much favor under present tax law.99 These I term the major of the
minor tax benefits of incorporation.
While the minor tax advantages denominated nontaxable compen-
sation are significant, the major of the minors-deferred compensa-
tion-is so attractive that it might tip the scales in favor of incorpora-
tion. This would be true, for example, in the case of a medical clinic
which could organize in such form as to qualify as a corporation,
making available to the professional men involved the benefits usually
reserved for employees of business corporations. 100 But in the total
perspective, these are still minor tax considerations.
97. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 422(b) (7).
98. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 423.
99. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 401. For general discussions, see Rice, The New
Tax Policy on Deferred Compensation. 59 MIcH. L. REv. 381 (1961); Strecker,
Taxation of Retirement Provision, 27 LAw & CO.TEMT. PROB. 67 (1962).
100. See notes 17 & 18 supra.
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V. MAjoR TAx ANALYSIS
The major tax analysis depends upon the comparative rates of tax
applicable to individuals and corporations. Put most simply, it would
appear that the corporate form would be advantageous in any case
where the corporate rate would be lower than the rate applicable
to individuals if the enterprise were conducted as a proprietorship or
partnership. Under the rate structure applicable to taxable years
after 1964 the maximum corporate rate is forty-eight per cent.' When
individual taxable income exceeds 22,000 dollars the marginal rate
becomes fifty per cent, and climbs steadily to a maximum of seventy
per cent on income over 100,000 dollars.10 2 Could it be said that where
the individual taxable income of the owners exceeds 22,000 dollars
(44,000 dollars in the case of married persons filing joint returns), the
corporate form will be advantageous, but otherwise not?0 3 The
question is complicated by the fact that corporate income below
25,000 dollars is taxed at only twenty-two per cent, while individual
taxable incomes over 6,000 dollars are taxed at twenty-five per cent
or more. Most importantly, the simple rules of thumb suggested
by the above two comparisons can be seriously misleading because
of the so-called double taxation of corporate business income.1 4 That
is, corporate business income is subject to tax at twenty-two through
forty-eight per cent, and in the normal course of events the net income
after tax distributed to the shareholders as dividends is further taxed
at fourteen through seventy per cent.05 The simple rate comparison
101. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 11.
102. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § I(a)(2).
103. See generally SHOCKNEY, & SwEENEY, TAX EFFECTS OF OPERATING AS A ConPo-
RATION OR PARTNEr.srP (1957); WILLis, PnTNmEasm TAXATION 470-80 (1957);
Boughner, Tax Advantages in Incorporating the Small Business, 44 ILL. B.J. 300
(1956); Caplin, Income Tax Pressures on the Form of Business Organization: Is It
Time for a "Doing Business" Tax? 47 VA. L. BEv. 249 (1961); Clapp, When is it
Desirable Taxwise to Incorporate a Partnership? N.Y.U. 10asH INST. ON FED. TAX
1107 (1952); Fillman, New Considerations in Selecting the Type of Business Organiza-
tion, 1956 TuL. TAX INST. 676; Friedman & Silbert, Form of the Entity and its Capital
Structure in Real Estate Acquisitions, N.Y.U. 16TH INST. ON FED. TAX 609 (1958);
Garcia, When Should a Sole Proprietor Incorporate His Business to Save Income Taxes?
35 TAXES 110 (1957); Korner, Tax Factors in Doing Business as a Corporation, 10
S.C.L.Q. 607 (1958); Ray & Hammonds, Corporation or Partnership: Tax Considera-
tions, 36 TAXES 9 (1958); Tritt & Spencer, Current Tax Problems in Incorporation of
a Going Business, U. So. CAL. 1958 TAX INST. 71; Calkins, Coughlin, Hacker, Kidder,
Sugarman & Wolf, Tax Problems of Close Corporations: A Survey 10 W. RES. L. REV.
9, 10-15 (1959); Note 30 B.U.L. REv. 248 (1950).
104. For general discussions of the problem which has been more blandly termed
"relative over-taxation of corporate earnings," see GOODE, THE CORPORATION INcOME
TAX (1951); HOLLAND, DiviDENDs UNDER THE INCOME TAX (1962); 40 Taxes 543
(1962), reviewed in HOLLAND, THE INcomES TAX BURDEN ON STOcKHOLDEs (1958);
Soule, Simplified Formula for "Partnership" Taxation of Corporate Income, 37 TAXES 701
(1959); U.S. TREAs. DEP'T, PRESmENTS TAX MESSAGE, 167-76 (1961); TAX PoLicy
LEAGUE, How SHALL BusInEss BE TAXED? (1937).
105. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 301, 316-17.
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overlooks the fact that the corporate tax is not in lieu of, but is in
addition to the ultimate shareholder tax. The major efforts of cor-
porate tax counsel are oriented toward reduction or elimination of
the dual tax impact. Two principal avenues of approach are open.
One is directed toward elimination or reduction of tax at the cor-
porate level. The payment of reasonable salaries for services rendered
by shareholder-employees, reasonable rental for shareholder-owned
property leased to the corporation, or interest on indebtedness owed
to shareholders accomplish this goal because the payments (unlike
dividends) may be deductible, eliminating the item at the corporate
level. 106 Note that this is accomplished by the substitution of a
current shareholder tax, which might be at a higher level than the
applicable corporate rate. To the extent that such devices are suc-
cessful, they accomplish pro tanto the same major tax result as a
proprietorship or partnership.
The other major route to elimination of the double tax is directed
at reduction or elimination of the ultimate shareholder tax. The
model case, though not very realistic, would be one where the
corporation never pays dividends, and the shares are sold or the
corporation liquidated after the original shareholders have died. The
shares have received a basis stepped-up to fair market value at
death,'1 7 and the gain computed on sale or liquidation by the executor
or heir is zero. 0 8 While Congress has imposed rather effective limi-
tations on the degree to which earnings may be allowed to accumu-
late, there is an area for effective planning.0 9 And even where the
original shareholders sell their shares,110 or liquidate the corporation
partially or completely,"' or redeem their shares (under severely
limited conditions ),112 the amount received may be given capital gain
treatment. Capital gain treatment connotes not only the favorable
rate (never more than twenty-five per cent, often less) but also the
permissible offset of the cost-basis of the shares against the amount
received before any taxable gain is computed.13 To the degree that
106, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 162-63.
107. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1014.
108. INr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1001.
109. INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 531-37, impose a penalty tax of 27 % to
381/2% on earnings (after ordinary corporate tax) accumulated by a corporation which
is formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding surtax on its shareholders. Generally,
accumulations beyond the reasonable needs of the business are within its purview.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 541-47, impose an even more severe penalty tax of 70%
on the undistributed earnings (after ordinary corporate tax) of personal holding com-
panies.
110. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §9 1001, 1201-02.
111. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 331, 346.
112. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 302-04, 318.
113. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1001. When a stock redemption is treated as a
dividend, the entire proceeds (up to the amount of earnings and profits) are taxable
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earnings can be accumulated without encountering the penalty tax
and realized as capital gain in a sale, liquidation, or redemption, the
ultimate shareholder tax may be materially reduced.
Finally, the use of the money representing the temporary or im-
mediate saving that results from substitution of the lower corporate
tax rate may generate enough income to more than offset any remain-
ing disadvantage arising from a controlled and reduced ultimate
shareholder tax. The variables involved, and the perspective re-
quired for competent planning in the choice of business form can
be illustrated by a series of hypothetical cases not atypical of what
will be encountered in practice. The cases illustrate the interaction
of the two main variables, level of corporate income and level of
individual income, complicated by immediate versus overall tax
burdens, and the possibility of capital gain treatment for the ultimate
shareholder tax.
A. Hypothetical Cases
Case I: Low Corporate and Low Shareholder Income.- A and B
contemplate formation of Alpha Corporation to carry on a business
to be owned one-half by each. Neither has income from other sources
and both intend to devote full time to the new venture. The expected
net income before taxes is 8,000 dollars per year, after payment of a
salary of 4,000 dollars to each. A and B are both single individuals,
neither of whom qualifies as head of a household.
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A similar computation, not reproduced here, was performed with
respect to each of the other three hypothetical cases. The results are
summarized and compared in the table, "Analysis of the Major Tax
Advantage or Detriment Resulting from the Use of the Corporate
















Case II: Low Corporate and High Shareholder Income.-C and D
contemplate formation of Beta Corp. to carry on a business to be
owned one-half by each. Neither has income from other sources
and both intend to devote full time to the venture. The expected net
income before taxes is 25,000 dollars per year, after payment of a
salary of 15,000 dollars to each. C and D are both single individuals,
neither of whom qualifies as head of a household.
Case III: High Corporate and Low Shareholder Income.-Si
through S10 contemplate formation of Gamma Corporation to carry
on a business to be owned one-tenth by each. All shareholders ex-
cept S1 and S2 have outside income of 4,000 dollars. Only S1 and S2
will be employed by the corporation, as President and Vice President
respectively. The expected net income before taxes is 100,000 dollars
per year, after the payment of salaries of 4,000 dollars each to S1
and S2. SI through S10 are single individuals, none of whom qualifies
as head of a household.
Case IV: High Corporate and High Shareholder Income.-X and Y
contemplate formation of Delta Corporation to carry on a business to
be owned one-half by each. Neither has income from other sources
and both intend to devote full time to the new venture. The expected
net income before taxes is 100,000 dollars per year, after payment of
a salary of 22,000 dollars to each. X and Y are both single individuals
neither of whom qualifies as head of household.
B. Conclusions Regarding the Hypothetical Cases
Case I illustrates that where both business and individual income
are low, the corporate form is disadvantageous from both the im-
mediate and overall tax viewpoints, under the eye of the major tax
analysis. This conclusion holds even if it is assumed that all corporate
earnings are retained for eventual realization as capital gains. It
may be surprising that the corporate form results in detriment even
from the immediate point of view. The reason is that while the
corporate rate on small corporations is only twenty-two per cent, it
is a flat rate, applying from the first dollar of corporate income. The
graduated individual tax, on the other hand, starts at fourteen per
cent and much of the income of these men would be taxed at less
than twenty-two per cent if received as partnership income. Since
the corporate form is disadvantageous tax-wise from both the im-
mediate and overall points of view, even assuming capital gain treat-
ment, partnership seems to be the indicated choice. Would the minor
tax benefits still make the corporate form attractive? Also, can these
men afford to take the risk of personal liability involved in the
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CORPORATE FORM
partnership form? These questions are considered later in connection
with the subchapter S election.
Case II shows that where shareholder income is high, and corporate
income is low, immediate tax advantage of significant amount will
arise. Whether the overall tax detriment will outweigh this depends
on the comparative amounts and on the certainty of the ultimate
shareholder tax. Where profits are accumulated and later realized
as capital gains, the overall tax detriment may disappear, as it did
here. When minor tax benefits are thrown in the balance, corporate
form would appear very attractive in this situation.
Case III indicates that where shareholder income is low (as where
there are many shareholders), even though corporate income is high,
corporate form may prove disadvantageous from both the immediate
and overall view, despite the possibility of capital gain treatment.
Somewhat surprisingly, long-term subchapter S election might be
attractive to some comparatively large corporations.
Case IV, when compared with Case II, shows that where share-
holder income is high, immediate tax advantage results whether
corporate income is high or low. Thus, the level of individual income
is the more important factor.
As we review the considerations discussed, the following picture
emerges. Where individual income is high, and even more clearly
where business income also is high, the corporate form will be
attractive for its immediate tax savings and the minor tax benefits
of nontaxable and deferred compensation. While corporate form al-
ways involves a tax detriment if it is assumed that all earnings will
be paid out as dividends, the possibility that some earnings will be
transformed into capital gain may reduce or eliminate the overall
disadvantage. Finally, the operation of the corporate form as a
massive tax-deferral mechanism, maling available large amounts of
funds for long periods of time, may more than offset the theoretical
detriment. The private law advantages of limited liability, free
transferability of interests, centralized management, and continuity
of life may be achieved consistent with the most desirable tax treat-
ment.
VI. SuBcHATFR S ELECTION: THE BEST OF ALL PossrBLE WoRLDs?
But there is a large class of small business investor-entrepreneuers
whose personal and business income are both relatively low, and
whose tax situation indicates the choice of the partnership. Corpo-
rate form, in addition to the overall detriment which always appears,
even imposes an immediate detrimental tax burden. Yet, private
law considerations, chiefly limited liability, may compel choice of
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the corporate form. Recognizing that a hardship is involved in such
cases, Congress, in 1958, enacted subchapter S of the Internal Revenue
Code, for the avowed purpose of removing the tax consideration
from the choice of business form." 4 While the legislation falls far
short of that stated objective, increasingly widespread adoption of its
elective treatment indicates that a need is being met."5
The general objective lying somewhat remotely behind subehapter
S and appearing only furtively in its substantive provisions, seems to
have been to extend partnership-like tax treatment to an electing
"small business corporation." Of course, the different legal nature of a
corporation, however small, may impose certain implicit limits on the
accomplishments of this objective. Three essential features of part-
nership tax treatment have been extended under Subchapter S. First,
114. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1371-77. "Your committee believes that the
enactment of a provision of this type is desirable because it permits businesses to
select the form of business organization desired, without the necessity of taking into
account major differences in tax consequence." S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
87 (1958). The author's survey of the literature leads him to estimate that the articles,
notes, and books on subchapter S published since 1958 may exceed 100. Some of the
best are as follows: Anthoine, Corporate Tax Election to Pass Income and Loss to
Shareholders, 1958 PRAc crCN LANW INST.; Anthoine, Federal Tax Legislation of 1958:
The Corporate Election and Collapsible Amendment, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1146 (1958):
Borsook, Few Personal Holding Companies Will Qualify for Subchapter S Election,
10 J. TAXA TION 19 (1958); Caplin, Partnership or S Corporation?: A Check List of the
Tax factors in the Choice, 12 J. TAXATION 32 (1960); Caplin, Subchapter S vs. Part-
nership: A Proposed Legislative Program, 46 VA. L. REv. 61 (1960); Cowen, Many
Potential Problems are Inherent in Subchapter S Election, 17 J. TAXATION 86 (1962);
Greene, Practitioners' Experiences with Subchapter S Reveal Many Doubts, Fears; Use
is Limited, 10 J. TAXA oN 130 (1959) (text less pessimistic than title); Kalupa,
Remedy of Defects in Subchapter S Asked by ABA Taxation Committee, 11 J. TAXAnTON
196 (1959); Kalupa, Subchapter S Election May Cause Increase in State Taxes, 10 J.
TA A-o 137 (1959); Landis, Advantages and Disadvantages of the Subchapter S
Election, N.Y.U. 18TH INST. oN FED. TAx 723 (1960); Meyer, Subchapter S Corpora-
tions, 36 TAxEs 919 (1958); Meyer, One Year of Subchapter S, 38 TAxEs 105 (1960);
Lourie, Subchapter S After Six Years of Operation: An Analysis of Its Advantages and
Defects, 22 J. TAXATON 166 (1965); Moore & Sorlien, Adventures in Subchapter S and
Section 1244, 14 TAx L. REv. 453 (1959); Roemele, Business Purpose and the Sub-
chapter S Reorganization, 58 MIcH. L. REV. 531 (1960); Stein, Optional Taxation of
Closely Held Corporations under the Technical Amendments Act of 1958 3 TAX CoUN.
Q. 63 (1959); Stine, Subchapter S Election May Increase State Income Tax on
Corporation or Stockholders, 10 J. TAxATON 91 (1959); Teschner, Advantages of
Periodic Inspection to Close Tax Traps Facing Small Corporations, 10 J. TAxATIoN 13
(1959); Villis, Subchapter S: A Lure to Incorporate Proprietorships and Partnerships,
6 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 505 (1959); Wright, Utilization of Subchapter S and Section 1214
Stock, 12 W. REs. L. REV. 225 (1961); Wright & Libin, Impact of Recent Tax Stim-
ulants on Modest Enterprises, 57 Mici. L. REv. 1131 (1959); Note, 72 HAav. L. RLv.
710 (1959); Note, 33 ST. JonN's L. REV. 187 (1958) (excellent).
115. Lourie, supra note 114, at 166, estimates that 10% of all corporations are now
being taxed under subchapter S, or perhaps more accurately, not being taxed. Lourie
proposes a number of improvements which would make subchapter S come closer
to extending partnership-type treatment to electing corporations. Caplin, supra note
114, at 61, who was addressing himself to Congress, recommended repeal and adoption
of a new and better integrated solution to the problem.
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the corporate tax is eliminated, the taxable income of the corpora-
tion being taxed currently to the shareholders, in proportion to their
holdings. Earnings actually distributed are taxed in the year dis-
tributed. Earnings not distributed are taxed in the shareholders'
taxable year during which ends the taxable year of the corporation.
If both the corporation and its shareholders are on the same taxable
year, as in the simple case where both use the calendar year, the
computation is simplified. The second partnership feature is the
pass-through of corporate capital gains. Ordinarily, the intervention
of the corporate entity serves to alter the tax character of items pass-
ing through it. Subchapter S makes an exception for corporate capital
gains, which retain their special tax treatment at the shareholder level.
Finally, corporate net operating losses are allowed to be deducted by
the shareholders-as ordinary and not capital losses-almost as they
arise. As the corporate taxable year ends, often coincidentally with
that of the shareholders, the latter are entitled to deduct their pro-
portionate share of the corporate net operating loss.
As will be inferred, the analogy between a partnership and sub-
chapter S is far from complete, and from the viewpoint of some
writers, even attenuated. The author feels that the differences are
often given exaggerated importance in an effort to call attention to
them, important as they certainly are. While a non-electing corpora-
tion is a very imperfect conduit, changing the tax character of items
passing through it, a partnership is an almost perfect conduit under
present law. Subchapter S lies somewhere in-between. More im-
portantly, election under Subchapter S does not change the essential
tax character of the entity; it still remains a corporation for all other
purposes of the tax law except to the extent changed by Subchapter S
itself. Thus, for example, transfers of property in formation of a
subchapter S corporation must qualify for tax-free treatment under
section 351 in subchapter C, "Corporate Distributions and Adjust-
ments," not under the analogous but simpler provisions of section 721
in subchapter K, "Partners and Partnerships." Of greater significance
is the fact that the liquidation of a subchapter S corporation is treated
the same as that of any other, normally a taxable exchange giving
rise to recognized gain or loss. Partnership liquidation, on the other
hand, is generally nontaxable. Distributions made by a subchapter S
corporation are also treated as corporate distributions under sub-
chapter C, leading to the possibility that ordinary dividend treatment
might celebrate the withdrawal of previously-taxed earnings-a prob-
lem discussed later.
The imperfection of the analogy between a partnership and a
subchapter S corporation has led to the not very successful search
for an adequate shorthand description of this new hybrid introduced
1727
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into the already crowded garden of business forms. The cutest is"corpnership," and while its light tone may lead some to reject it,
there may be something to be said for a newly-coined word to
describe a totally new and unique thing. "Pseudo-corporation" and
"quasi-corporation" have gained some currency, but the former clearly
(and the latter to some extent) connote that the corporate entity is
lacking or imperfect. This is not true, as for all purposes of private
law, a subchapter S corporation is a valid and viable legal entity,
fully vested with limited liability and the other characteristics dis-
cussed earlier. Some refer to "electing corporations" or "tax-option
corporations" but these terms seem too vague to communicate mean-
ing to one not familiar with the problem, and inexact to the sophisti-
cated. Since it does not appear to describe anything, but only to
signal some undisclosed meaning to the uninitiated, and communi-
cates exact meaning to those who have taken the trouble to become
informed, the author prefers (until something better comes along)
the term Subchapter S corporation.
In at least three situations, subehapter S would seem to offer-as
Voltaire's caricature of the philosopher Leibniz, Dr. Pangloss, would
say-the best of all possible worlds." 6 In the model case of low
individual and low business income, the private law advantages of
the corporate form are combined with partnership-type tax treatment.
For new enterprises, however large, which may expect to suffer losses
in the early years, ideal loss planning can be combined for the first
time with the private law protection of limited liability. Finally, any
corporation-regardless of size-which expects to have a large, non-
recurring capital gain may eliminate the dual tax by electing under
subchapter S, even if for only one year. While the "one-shot" election
is penalized to the extent of withdrawing the availability of sub-
chapter S benefits for five years, many large corporations having non-
recurring major capital gains would not be seriously deterred by this
consideration.
A. Requirements for Subchapter S Election
Unlike the provisions of section 1244 (enacted in the same bill)
which introduce size-in terms of equity capital-into the definition
of a "small business corporation," subchapter S could logically apply
to a multi-million dollar concern, so long as it had no more than ten
116. VOLTAIF, CANDIDE, 2, 117-18. Pangloss sometimes said to Candide: "There
is a concatenation of events in this best of all possible worlds; for if you had not been
kicked out of a magnificent castle for love of Miss Cunegonde; if you had not been
put into the Inquisition; if you had not walked over America: if you had not stabbed
the Baron: if you had not lost all your sheep from the fine country of El Dorado:
you would not be here eating preserved citrons and pistachio-nuts."
"All that is very well," answered Candide, "but let us cultivate our garden."
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shareholders. The ten shareholders must be natural persons or the
estates of decedent former shareholders, the ownership of stock by a
corporation, partnership, or trust serving to disqualify the corporation
for election. All shareholders must be citizens or residents of the
United States, and the corporation must be a domestic corporation,
and cannot be a member of an affiliated group such as are permitted
to file consolidated returns. Since the prohibition on corporate share-
holders would prevent an electing corporation from being a subsidiary
of another, the effect of this reference to affiliated groups is to preclude
the subchapter S corporation from being a parent corporation, i.e.,
owning eighty per cent or more of the stock of another corporation." 7
The nature of the income may also disqualify a corporation from
election. If more than twenty per cent of its gross receipts are from
passive investment sources of the personal holding company type, or
if more than eighty per cent of the corporation's gross receipts are
derived from sources outside the United States, disqualification ensues.
Finally, the corporation must have only one class of stock, although
the use of debt in the capital structure is not forbidden. If all these
requirements are met, and if all shareholders consent to the imposition
of tax on their shares of undistributed corporate taxable income, the
filing of Form 2553 by the corporation will complete the election.
B. Problems under Subchapter S
Election, unfortunately for taxpayers, must be made without the
aid of hindsight. An election for a particular taxable year of the
corporation must be made within the first month of that year, or
during the preceding month. Election may be discontinued in two
ways: termination or disqualification. Termination is voluntary, unani-
mous, and is effective only prospectively, that is, for future taxable
years. The commitment to subchapter S, made before the year's
profits can be known, may not be withdrawn thereafter. Disqualifica-
tion, presumably involuntary and perhaps even inadvertent, has
retroactive effect. Any circumstance which would cause the corpora-
tion no longer to meet the definitional requirements will serve to
disqualify. Thus, if one share of stock is transferred in trust, if the
corporation issues a new preferred stock, or if the income includes
too much of the passive investment type, election is "terminated" as
of the first of the year. Obviously some of these events might be
brought about with the evident purpose of causing termination of
the election. One cause for concern to those considering election under
117. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1371(d), added by 78 Stat. 19 (1964), permits an
exception for a wholly inactive subsidiary which does no business and has no taxable
income. The reason for this was to accommodate certain corporations which form
inactive subsidiaries in certain states in order to protect the corporate name.
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subchapter S is the fact that any shareholder has the power to bring
about retroactive termination of the election unilaterally. The power
might even be used vindictively. The legal effect of agreements among
shareholders, precluding the steps which would cause disqualification,
might be questioned since Congress clearly intended that all the
shareholders must consent to election. One reason may have been
that there is a question as to the constitutionality of a tax which would
require inclusion in shareholders' returns of corporate profits before
their division." 8 On the other hand, voluntary revocation requires
unanimous action as does election, perhaps indicating that a share-
holder's commitment is not lightly to be reversed. Indeed, this re-
quirement of unanimity for voluntary termination of election argues
strongly for the validity of reasonable protective agreements.
Another area of difficulty which has appeared is the uncertainty
which clouds a transfer of stock to a new shareholder, whether by
death or inter vivos. His consent is positively required rather than
inferred from silence. During the period following such a transfer,
the election is in jeopardy until a new consent is filed. For a period,
there was a thirty-day deadline on this filing, but the Service has
softened this requirement where the new shareholder ultimately
manifests his consent."
9
The most serious defect of subchapter S, which probably deters
many from electing, may be called the "lock-in" of previously-taxed
earnings. If a partner has paid tax on his distributive share left in-
vested in the partnership, he may withdraw money tax-free up to this
amount. The same is true of shareholders of subchapter S corpora-
tions, but with some important differences. The difficulty arises where
a corporation which has a pre-election profit history (or has generated
earnings and profits in excess of its taxable income) makes distribu-
tions in excess of its current taxable income, in a year when election
is not in force. It could even apply to a distribution made at a time
when election was in force, but was retroactively terminated through
disqualification. Since all distributions are presumed to be made out
of earnings and profits, it is conceivable that the subchapter S share-
holder might be required to pay dividend tax on what he considered to
be already-taxed earnings. 20 Of course, taxation is not entirely
118. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). But see Eder v. Commissioner, 138
F.2d 27, 31 (2d Cir. 1943), which assumes the constitutionality of the provisions of
the foreign personal holding company law (§§ 551-56) taxing undistributed income
directly to the shareholders. Helvering v. National Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282 (1938)
(dictum), supports such treatment, at least in the case of the one-man corporation.
BrrrKER, FEDmAL INcomm TAxA-ox OF COm'OnARoNS AND SHmAnoLnaris 180, 206
(1959). See also Dowdle, Can Domestic Shareholders Be Taxed on Foreign Corporate
Earnings Prior to DistributionP 40 T.A.s 436 (1962).
119. Lourie, supra note 114, at 170.
120. Id. at 168-69.
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unjustified since the pattern of the corporate tax calls for it. However,
in the context of subchapter S, it constitutes a serious failure to extend
partnership-type treatment, and should be remedied. One solution is
to reverse the presumption as to distributions made by former electing
subchapter S corporations so that the previously-taxed earnings
account is used before the distributions are deemed to represent
earnings and profits. A related problem arises from the non-trans-
ferability of the previously-taxed earnings account. It is deemed
personal to the owner (unlike the partnership situation), and does
not become available to the new owner, not even as executor or
heir.12 ' Again, more nearly partnership-like treatment would seem
appropriate. A guide to legislation in this area might be to treat
the electing corporation's shareholders as much like partners for tax
purposes as is administratively feasible and not inconsistent with the
differences in the legal nature of the two "entities."
One recommended solution to the problem of the "freeze-in" of
previously-taxed earnings would be to avoid the problem at the
source. That is, make certain that all corporate taxable income is
distributed, to be loaned back or re-invested in the form of additional
stock, if corporate financial needs dictate. One difficulty is that the
exact amount of the corporate taxable income cannot be known until
after the end of the year, and then it is too late. One commentator
recommended adoption of a rule which would treat distributions made
during the early part of the following year as having been made on the
last day of the preceding taxable year.122 Analogies could be drawn
from the field of trust taxation, deductions between related parties,
personal holding companies, and the accumulated earnings tax. Ad-
justing distributions could then be completely effective to control this
problem. Another difficulty, where the funds are re-invested, is the
possibility that the Service would successfully ignore the transaction-
treating the funds as previously-taxed undistributed earnings-or con-
sider the debt instruments as a new and prohibited second class of
stock.'23 Since complete and retroactive disqualification would result
from the characterization of such debt as a second class of stock, the
121. Ibid.
122. Ibid.
123. The "thin incorporation" doctrine has recently been applied, as numerous com-
mentators predicted that it would, to deny subchapter S status to a corporation whose
indebtedness to shareholders was held to constitute a prohibited second (and preferred)
class of stock. Henderson v. United States, 65-2 CCH U.S. Tax Cas. ir 9598 (M.D.
Ala. 1965); Catalina Homes, Inc., 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1361 (1964). The latter case
was discussed in Angvire, Thin Capitalization of Subchapter S Corporations, 9 TAx
CouNs. Q. 153 (1965). See generally Caplin, The Caloric Count of a Thin Incorpora-
tion, N.Y.U. 17Tn INST. ON FED. TAx 771 (1959), for a comprehensive analysis of




cure may be worse than the disease. It might be wiser to take the
risk involved in having previously-taxed earnings remain in the corpo-
ration than to jeopardize the entire election under subchapter S. These
considerations limit unnecessarily the attractiveness of election by
corporations which must depend upon accumulated income for
expanding capital needs.
Except in unusual cases,124 the problems surrounding previously-
taxed earnings would arise in connection with old corporations which
have a profit history before electing. New corporations may regard
the subchapter S election with much less fear and more trusting
acceptance. The personal nature of the previously-taxed earnings
account is still a drawback, and attempt should be made to drain off
all current taxable income before the year closes. If by error more
is withdrawn, the amount would be a nontaxable return of capital,
unless the corporation had a pre-election earnings history, or had
generated earnings and profits in excess of taxable income.
Summary and Conclusion
For high income investors operating large enterprises, benign tax
treatment combines with the private law advantages-chiefly limited
liability, centralized management, and continuity of life-to indicate
choice of the corporate form. Lower income persons conducting
smaller enterprises may find Subchapter S an ideal solution, affording
favorable partnership-type tax treatment without exposure to the risk
of personal liability. And new business ventures-regardless of size-
with expectation of loss in the early years-may find the optimum loss
planning formerly available only in the partnership form without
sacrificing the limited liability so necessary to the financial security
and peace of mind of the investor-entrepreneur.
124. Lourie, supra note 114, at 166, calls attention to the possibility that even a
corporation not having a history of pre-election earnings might run afoul of the
"lock-in" of previously taxed earnings. There are certain items-for example, interest
on state and local bonds and the profit element in life insurance proceeds paid by
reason of death-which are excluded from gross income, but which still are considered
to increase a corporation's earnings and profits for purposes of characterizing a future
distribution as a dividend. Treas. Reg. § 1.312-6 (1955).
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